National Identity and Religious Diversity by Harttgen, Kenneth & Opfinger, Matthias
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
National Identity and Religious Diversity
Kenneth Harttgen and Matthias Opfinger
Eth Zurich, University Trier
July 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50151/
MPRA Paper No. 50151, posted 30. September 2013 13:27 UTC
National Identity and Religious Diversity 
Kenneth Harttgen, Matthias Opfinger* 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Abstract 
We construct an index for national identity using information from the World Values Survey on 
peoples' affection towards the nation. We then analyze the relationship between national identity and 
religious diversity. The results show that religious diversity is significantly and negatively related to 
national identity. We also find support for the previous finding that ethnic diversity does not seem to 
be related to national identity. Democratic institutions and mobility throughout the country are 
positively related to national identity if religious diversity is sufficiently high. Democratic institutions 
can overcome the negative effect of religious diversity on national identity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Large empires have disintegrated into smaller units over the last centuries or, in some cases, only in 
the last decades. New entities have been formed along specific lines which are today known as nation 
states. But how did these nations evolve? What do the inhabitants have in common? The analysis of 
nations is popular in the social and political sciences1. But it can also have important implications from 
an economic point of view. Differences in economic growth and wealth across nations, and their 
causes, have always been an important field of study for economists.  
In the legal studies the definition of a nation is based on three conditions. First, there has to be a group 
of people which live together in, second, a common territory which has clear borders to the territory of 
other groups. Third, there has to be a force which governs these people and sets rules to which the 
inhabitants have to obey. This force, typically called the government, also has to have the ability to put 
through their rules, for example by handing out punishments to those who do not obey. 
Smith (1991) who devotes a whole book to the question of nationality and national identity stresses 
that there is no generally accepted definition of a nation in the literature. But he lists features which 
help to define what constitutes a nation. He confirms the legal view arguing that there has to be a 
human population which lives in a common historical territory. But he adds the factors of a common 
public culture, common legal rights and duties, and a common economy. 
If we assume that these conditions are met and a nation exists, the question arises if and why people 
feel bonds towards their nationality. We will focus on exactly this question. First of all, we have to 
clarify what these bonds, which we will call ‘national identity’ from now on, are made of. Kiely et al. 
(2001) argue that people claim to identify with their nation by presenting certain identity markers to 
their fellow countrymen. Bond (2006), following Kiely et al. (2001), stresses the importance of 
residence, birth, and ancestry as the most important markers of a national identity. Jones (1997) 
analyzes the determinants of Australian national identity. He splits this concept into two categories. 
The first group of factors he regards as important for national identity is similar to the idea of identity 
markers, which he calls nativism. These markers are objectively relatively easy to identify. The second 
category Jones (1997) proposes, refers to the respect for the country’s institutions and a feeling of 
being Australian. The author calls this the “affective dimension” (p. 290) of national identity. 
In the remainder of this paper we will lay the focus on this affective dimension of national identity. 
We are interested in the degree to which people feel that they belong to the nation. Hereby, we follow 
Anderson (2006) who describes the nation as an imagined community. In his view people feel 
attracted to the idea of nationalism although there is no sophisticated philosophical explanation for the 
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 It is investigated by, e.g. Anderson (2006), Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Bloom (1990), Gillis (1996), Miller 
(2000), Triandafyllidou (1998), Wodak et al. (1998), or concerning the role for specific nations or Europe by, 
e.g. Checkel (1999), Maier (1997), Noiriel (1996), or Smith (1992). 
existence of nations and national identity. We address this attraction to the concept of nationalism. We 
are not so much interested in the objective identity markers proposed by Bond (2006), but in the 
attitudes the people reveal towards their nation and in their feelings of belonging together. 
The economic literature stresses the importance a common identity might have. It appears feasible to 
assume that a common identity increases trust among people which then leads to more favorable 
economic outcomes2. Miguel (2004) shows that nation-building policies in Tanzania created more 
favorable economic outcomes compared to Kenya, where these policies have not been adopted. 
Besides the probably positive economic effects of a common identity, Smith (1991) argues that there 
are also social gains from a national identity, such as social solidarity or popular sovereignty (p. 18). 
But it also seems obvious that there might be a possible dark side to national identity. This might 
appear if it is performed overtly strongly. If national identity leads to the discrimination against or 
even oppression of minorities social instability is likely to arise. Georgiaidis and Manning (2009) 
show for the United Kingdom that people belonging to minorities are less connected to the nation 
when they feel they are discriminated against. An extreme outcome of nationalism is described in 
Calhoun (1993) who refers to ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav war in the early 1990’s. Jones (1997) 
sees the exclusion of marginalized groups from the labor market as another negative economic 
consequence of overt nationalism. 
Most of the studies cited so far (Bond, 2006; Calhoun, 1993; Jones, 1997; also Miles and Rochefort, 
1991) try to explain national identity. They have in common the argument that social heterogeneity 
prevents the formation of a common national identity3. They all refer to the ethnic dimension 
following the idea of identity markers explained above. The authors argue that in ethnically diverse 
countries people find it harder to detect the commonness with others and therefore national identity 
should be lower if the country consists of many different ethnic groups. However, all these studies 
lack a clear numerical concept of national identity. 
In a recent, well executed, study, Masella (2013) examines empirically the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and national identity. Somewhat surprising, he does not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables. However, he finds that national identity is lower in minority 
groups and higher in the majority group when ethnic diversity in a country is high, and vice versa 
when ethnic diversity is low. 
We contribute to this literature by proposing that religious diversity, as another form of social 
heterogeneity, can better explain the formation of a national identity. Principally, an individual is free 
to choose his religion whereas ethnicity is predetermined by the genes. The literature on religious 
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 Compare, for examaple, Tabellini (2010). 
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 Social heterogeneity has been identified as an important variable in other economic studies, e.g. Easterly and 
Levine (1997) on growth in Africa, La Porta et al. (1999) on government performance, Alesina et al. (1999) on 
public goods, or Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005, 2005a), and Vanhanen (1999) 
on civil conflicts. 
switching reveals that religious choice is not necessarily path dependent. Social, educational, 
occupational, and geographical mobility, as well as marriage are important drivers of religious 
switching over an individual’s life course (see, e.g. Sherkat, 1991; Musick and Wilson, 1995). As 
Eaton et al. (2011) argue, similar interests, as expressed by performing the same religious rituals, can 
promote the formation of a common identity even if people come from different backgrounds. 
Indulging in the same faith and performing the same religious rituals can be a form of signaling 
conformity with the majority which in turn leads to the formation of a common (national) identity. On 
the opposite, practicing a different faith creates a cultural difference between people which prevents 
the formation of a common identity. Consequently, we argue that the choice of a religion, as a signal 
of conformity with the values exercised in the nation, is more important for the formation of a national 
identity than coincidental ethnic differences. Rather, these ethnic differences may be overcome by 
sharing religious beliefs. Following earlier research mentioned above, we expect to find a negative 
relationship between national identity and social heterogeneity or, to be more explicit, religious 
diversity. 
Our approach differs methodologically from Masella’s (2013) study. Masella (2013) measures 
national identity on the individual level based on a question from the World Values Survey whether a 
person sees herself belonging to an ethnic group or to the nation. The approach of individual identity is 
common in the economic literature. Based on the influential article by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
which is the first to incorporate identity in the utility function of individuals, other studies have been 
conducted to further investigate the formation process4 of identities and the role of chosen identities5. 
However, we are interested in the societal dimension of national identity. We want to compare 
countries which differ in religious diversity and see if national identity at the country level is affected 
by these differences. That is why we quantify national identity at the country level.  
Masella (2013) uses one question to measure the national sentiment of each person. One of the main 
contributions of our study is that we calculate an index of national identity which is based on three 
indicators. We try to capture one underlying factor to these three indicators to identify the inherent 
affection towards the nation. The next Section will describe the construction of the index in more 
detail. Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of our index of national identity and religious diversity at the 
country level. Furthermore, Masella (2013) admits that his sample consists of only 21 countries which 
might not be “a good substitute for a world-wide sample”. We have data on national identity for 69 
countries although some have to be dropped in the empirical analysis due to missing values in other 
variables. This is obviously still not a perfect substitute for a world sample, but at least we are getting 
closer. 
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 See e.g. Austin-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Battu et al. (2007) on education decisions, Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 
(2003) on race identity formation of African Americans, Constant and Zimmerman (2008) and Constant et al. 
(2009) on the integration of immigrants. 
-FIGURE 1 HERE- 
Finally, after establishing that there is no statistically significant relationship between ethnic diversity 
and national identity, Masella (2013) concentrates on the role of minority and majority groups and 
presents evidence that the respective behavior changes with ethnic diversity. Our goal is different. We 
hypothesize a negative relationship between social heterogeneity and national identity and therefore 
propose that the role of religious diversity should be investigated more closely. In our empirical 
analysis we show that high levels of religious diversity are indeed correlated with lower levels of 
national identity. This finding holds when we employ instrumental variable regression in order to 
account for possible endogeneity. Furthermore, we find that democratic institutions and mobility 
throughout the country become positively related to national identity when religious diversity 
increases. Finally, we find a negative relationship between income and national identity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our index of national identity. Data and 
methodology are presented in Section III. Section IV shows the empirical results, followed by a 
discussion in Section V. Section VI briefly concludes. 
 
II. NATIONAL IDENTITY INDEX 
In the Introduction we argue that one of the contributions of this paper is the calculation of an index to 
measure national identity rather than relying on one single indicator. By calculating an index for 
national identity, we aim to identify a common underlying factor captured by a set of indicators of 
national interests and orientations. Furthermore, once one accepts this measure, we are directly able to 
analyze the determinants of national identity. 
Similar to Masella (2013) we use information from the World Values Survey (WVS) to identify 
indicators which might be used for the calculation of our measure of national identity. However, the 
selection of the possible indicators should be exercised with caution. Our index is supposed to capture 
the affective dimension of national identity which is why we are not interested in the objective identity 
markers described above. Furthermore, we must not include indicators which capture the identity 
towards another political entity than the nation. In the WVS there is a question that asks whether a 
person is interested in politics which might, at first glance, be a suitable indicator to predict national 
identity. But we have to consider that people might be interested in politics but feel far distant from 
their nation, for example, a lot of people in the Basque country might be interested in politics. But this 
interest might refer in first place to Basque issues rather than Spanish. In the same line the population 
in the Northern part of Belgium might be heavily interested in Flemish matters but not too much in 
Belgian politics. As we are also interested in the relationship between democratic institutions and 
national identity we also have to exclude those questions to which the answers might depend on the 
political system. That is why we do not include indicators such as the confidence in the parliament or 
the judicial system which would also have been available in the WVS data. 
Taking into account these issues we can identify three indicators that are suitable for our purpose. The 
first indicator is the question on which Masella (2013) bases his analysis. The question asks whether 
the respondent sees himself belonging to some ethnic group or to the nation. We code this as 1 if the 
respondent answers he belongs to the nation and 0, otherwise. Anderson (2006) describes that “the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (p.7). In the WVS there exists a 
question if the person is proud of being of the respective nationality. We use this question as a proxy 
for this conceived comradeship. Anderson (2006) continues: “[I]t is this fraternity that makes it 
possible, […], not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” (p.7). We use the 
question from the WVS if the respondent would be willing to fight for his country to address this 
issue. We use these three indicators to identify a common factor which we define as national identity. 
To derive the national identity index, we apply a principal component analysis. Principal component 
analysis is an aggregation technique to identify from a set of variables those linear combinations that 
best capture the common information behind the variables (Filmer and Scott, 2008). The main idea of 
this approach is to construct an aggregated uni-dimensional index over the range of the three identified 
indicators. The approach of aggregating different variables to a uni-dimensional index is widely used 
in the economic and social literature. We closely follow the approach of Filmer and Pritchett (2001) 
and Sahn and Stifel (2001, 2003) to construct an index of material welfare based on the possession of 
housing durables. Paldam and Gundlach (2013) use an index approach based on the WVS data to 
derive an index of religiosity to analyze the religious transition over time6. 
We assume that the three indicators we identified can explain the long-term national identity of a 
person measured by an aggregated index: 
 =  + 		 + 

  
where  is the national identity index, the  's refer to the respective variable of the person j 
recorded as dichotomous variables in the data and the b's are the respective weights for each variable 
used to aggregate the indicators to a uni-dimensional index and that are to be estimated. In our model 
this means that the kth identity variable, identified by , with k=1,2,3, is a linear function of a 
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 A large body of literature also exists using an asset index to explain inequalities in educational outcomes (e.g. 
Ainsworth and Filmer 2006), health outcomes (e.g. Bollen et al. 2002), child mortality (e.g. Sastry 2004) when 
data on income or expenditure is missing. In addition, asset indexes are used to analyze changes and 
determinants of poverty (e.g. Stifel and Christiaensen 2007). 
common factor, which is ‘national identity’ in our case. We rely on the first principal component as 
our national identity index7. 
One could object that three indicators is a rather small amount to capture the ‘true’ underlying national 
identity. However, we explained our criteria for the selection of the indicators and the three questions 
chosen were the only which fulfilled those criteria. The first component explains around 30% of the 
covariance indicating that we capture the common factor behind the indicators fairly well. With these 
indicators we are able to calculate the national identity index for 69 countries. Table A1 in the 
appendix presents descriptive statistics, while Figure A1 shows the distribution of our index at the 
micro level. The mean value of the identity index is close to zero with a range of around -2 to +1.5. 
Table A2 reveals the levels of national identity at the country level.  
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Data 
The index of national identity will be the dependent variable in our empirical estimations. The 
explanatory variable of main interest is religious diversity, which has also been termed fragmentation 
or fractionalization. The index of religious diversity measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
people from a population belong to different religious groups. It takes on the value 0 if everyone 
belongs to the same group and would equal 1 if everyone in the society was member of a different 
religious group. It is calculated as 1-H, where H is a Herfindahl-Index which is gained by ∑ 	 , 
where  is there share of people belonging to each religious group i and N is the number of groups. 
We use the data on religious fractionalization provided by Alesina et al. (2003). We include ethnic 
diversity to control if our results are in line with the findings from Masella (2013). Information is 
taken from the same paper (Alesina et al., 2003). 
We include income per capita to control for the possibility that economic development might have an 
impact on the formation of a national identity. Since income per capita might serve as a control 
variable for general economic development it can help reduce the negative consequences of possibly 
omitted variables. Hence income per capita is included in all regressions. In order to reduce the risk of 
reverse causality we want to use income per capita from a year before 1982 when the observation 
period on national identity begins. The Maddison (2010) online database offers information on income 
per capita, also for the single former Soviet nations, for the year 1973. 
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 An alternative way to estimate the weights to derive the aggregated index is a factor analysis employed, for 
example, by Sahn and Stifel (2001) and Paldam and Gundlach (2013). However, the two estimation methods 
show very similar results. For a systematic overview of different aggregation techniques, see Filmer and Scott 
(2008). 
Apparently, the political environment could influence identification with the nation. We control for the 
level of democracy by including the Polity score from the Polity IV database. It ranges from -10 for 
autocracies to +10 for full democracies. Smith (1991) proposes that mobility throughout the country 
might also foster the formation of a national identity. We take this possibility into account by 
controlling for physical, as well as, non-physical mobility. As a proxy for physical mobility we use the 
amount of kilometers of paved roads per 1,000 inhabitants. The data come from the CIA World 
Factbook. We use the number of phone lines per 100 inhabitants to capture the possible effect of non-
physical mobility. Information is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We 
also control for geographical and geopolitical factors by including controls for country size, 
population, and latitude and dummy variables for former colonies and EU membership. Information is 
taken from the CIA World Factbook, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and Nunn and 
Puga (2012). 
We can calculate the index of national identity for 69 countries. However, for three countries we lack 
information on the Polity score. These are Iceland, Luxembourg, and Malta, so that these are not 
included in our regressions. Table 1 gives an overview of the summary statistics for those 66 countries 
on which we base our empirical results. 
Table 1: Country-level Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
National Identity 0.010 0.035 0.375 -0.939 0.886 
Religious Diversity 0.461 0.478 0.211 0.004 0.860 
Log Income 1973 8.512 8.575 0.862 6.210 9.810 
Ethnic Diversity 0.346 0.320 0.226 0.000 0.930 
Polity score 1973 -0.894 -7 8.025 -9 10 
Area in sqkm 1,304,658 242,324 3,110,025 20,273 17,098,242 
Population in mill. 76.835 15.502 221.654 1.340 1337.825 
Latitude 31.280 41.890 28.175 -41.806 64.481 
Former Colony 0.303 0 0.463 0 1 
EU-12 Membership  0.151 0 0.361 0 1 
Roads per 1,000 6.658 4.342 6.398 0.147 26.069 
Phone Lines per 100 24.162 19.637 18.559 0.216 65.376 
 
National identity ranges from -0.939 to 0.886 index points at the country level. The lowest value is 
calculated for Japan whereas Morocco displays the highest level of national identity. The median lies 
between the observations for Argentina and Bulgaria and Ireland comes closest to the mean value. 
Concerning the explanatory variable of main interest, religious diversity, we find that Morocco is the 
most homogeneous country. The value implies that the probability that two randomly drawn people 
belong to different denominations is only 0.4%. On the other side, this probability amounts to 86% in 
South Africa, the religiously most diverse country in our sample. Similarly Uganda is the ethnically 
most heterogeneous country, whereas the probability that two persons belong to different ethnic 
groups is virtually zero in South Korea. 
2. Methodology 
We saw in Figure 1 that there appears to be a negative relationship between religious diversity and the 
level of national identity. We conduct several regressions to verify this suspicion. Unfortunately, 
Alesina et al. (2003) report data on religious fractionalization for only one point in time. It follows that 
we cannot run fixed effects panel data methods. Thus, we build the averages of national identity over 
the five waves of the WVS for each country. We run cross country regressions in which we use 
income and the polity score from the year 1973 to reduce the risk of reverse causality. The estimated 
model is of the form: 
 =  +  ×  +  ×  +  × ℎ+		  + ! 
where  is the index of national identity in country i,  is religious diversity in country i,  is 
income in country i, ℎ is ethnic diversity in country i,   is a vector of the other control 
variables, and ! is the error term. 
The coefficient of main interest is .  > 0 implies that national identity is higher in countries with a 
religiously diverse population.  < 0 would obviously mean that national identity is high at low levels 
of religious diversity. As we argued in the Introduction, it is feasible to assume a negative relationship, 
so that we expect the coefficient on religious diversity to be negative. 
In our empirical analysis we have to take into account the possible endogeneity of religious diversity, 
which could arise from reverse causality or omitted variables. Hence, we will have to rely on two stage 
least squares estimation, for which we need an instrumental variable for religious diversity. Fincher 
and Thornhill (2008) propose that the disease environment can explain differences in religious 
diversity across countries. They stress that religious diversity develops from “evolved behavioral 
strategies for the avoidance and management of infectious disease.” (p.1). In their paper, the authors 
explain the theoretical process which they also evaluate empirically. The essence of their theoretical 
approach is as follows. Initially a group of individuals is based in a uniform geographical 
environment. They share a uniform distribution of immunity against specific diseases. As a 
consequence, there is no need to separate from one another and a common culture, where religion is an 
integral part of, emerges. 
Over time, locally different pathogens, which cause diseases emerge. Parts of the prior uniform group 
build an immunity pattern against these diseases. However, not the entire population develops the 
same immunity pattern because the pathogens are, as mentioned above, locally different. It follows 
that separate groups evolve out of the former uniform population, which differ with respect to 
immunity against contagious diseases. 
As a consequence of different immunity patterns, the individuals evolutionally developed antipathogen 
behaviors to prevent the infection with specific diseases. This antipathogen behavior results in two 
reactions, limited dispersal and assortative sociality. Limited dispersal describes the reaction of 
individuals from one group with regards to members of other groups. They reduce contact with people 
who share different immunity patterns in order to reduce the risk of getting infected with a disease 
against which they are not immune. Likewise, those individuals increase the contact with people from 
their own group which share the same immunity pattern. As a consequence, assortative sociality then 
describes the fact that individuals form alliances with people of their group. These alliances include 
the formation of a common culture in each distinct group. 
The probability that individuals reduce intergroup contact increases with the harmfulness of the 
diseases. This prevents the flow of ideas between groups. Thus, immunologically distinct groups 
develop different cultures over time, of which religion appears to be an integral part. In their empirical 
validation, Fincher and Thornhill (2008) verify that there are more religions in countries with higher 
disease prevalence. They can also explain why religious diversity is especially high in the tropic 
regions. The authors show that groups disperse over shorter distances in a very stressful disease 
environment, as in the tropic regions. Small groups separate from each other in small areas, but reduce 
intergroup contact in order to reduce the risk of getting infected. 
For the disease environment to be a suitable instrument, the exclusion restriction requires that the 
disease environment does not affect the formation of a national identity through another channel than 
diversity. It is by no means obvious how people should base their attitudes towards their nationality on 
the probability of being affected by specific diseases. The variables that Fincher and Thornhill (2008) 
present describe the disease richness and the prevalence of pathogens. People who live in a country 
will most probably not base their national identity on these variables.  
One might argue that the variables proposed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008) might influence national 
identity through the satisfaction with the country’s health system. However, the health system is in 
most cases used for the treatment of existing diseases instead of fighting disease richness. A possible 
exception is vaccination against infectious diseases. Even if one accepts that this channel might affect 
the satisfaction with the health system, this should not affect the national identity index based on our 
three indicators. We have purposely left out of our calculation those indicators which might be 
influenced by those feelings. The indicators we chose, the willingness to fight, pride for the 
nationality, and the preferred geographical group should be independent of the country's disease 
environment. We cannot think of another way how our index could be affected by the disease 
variables, so that we are confident that the exclusion restriction is not violated and that we can use the 
disease environment as an instrumental variable for religious diversity. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the results of our empirical estimations. All variables that have been deemed 
important for the explanation of national identity in the literature are included as control variables. 
However, the results which are of prior importance are those on religious and ethnic diversity. In 
column 1 we run cross-country OLS regressions of our index of national identity on religious 
diversity, the log of income, ethnic diversity, and the set of remaining control variables. The standard 
errors are shown in parentheses underneath the coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
As we have noted above we have to consider possible endogeneity issues of our main explanatory 
variable, religious diversity. Column 2 repeats the regression from column 1, but religious diversity is 
instrumented by the disease and pathogen variables proposed by Fincher and Thornhill (2008). The 
two variables enter statistically significantly at the one and two percent level, respectively, in the first 
stage regressions. However, we have to admit that the first stage F-statistic is only around 4 which is 
fairly low compared to the F-statistic of 10 which is used as a rule of thumb for the validity of 
instrumental variables. Statistical tests reveal that our first stage regressions achieve to refuse the 
hypothesis of underidentification. Nevertheless, the weak identification test of Stock and Yogo (2005) 
proposes that our instruments are weak. Consequently, we also present standard errors gained with the 
conditional likelihood ratio approach proposed by Moreira (2003) and implemented for use in Stata by 
Andrews et al. (2006). These are larger which reduces the level of statistical significance but lets us be 
optimistic that relationships that appear to be significant are so indeed. 
In columns 3 through 6 of Table 2 we add several interaction terms to analyze the institutions that 
mediate the effect of religious diversity. The results we present are again estimated via two stage least 
squares. As in column 2 we present the regular standard errors underneath the coefficients and also the 
standard errors gained by the conditional likelihood ratio approach. In column 3 we add an interaction 
term between religious diversity and the Polity score. We include an interaction term between 
religious diversity and the amount of paved roads in column 4. Religious diversity is interacted with 
phone lines, which we use a s a proxy variable for non-physical mobility, in column 5. Finally, in 
column 6 we include an interaction term between religious diversity and population size. Table A3 in 
the appendix presents the results of columns 3 through 6 when using simple OLS regression 
methodology. 
 
Table 2: Regression results, dependent variable: national identity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation method OLS IV IV IV IV IV 
Religious Diversity -0.540 -1.329 -1.476 -2.119 -2.120 -1.265 
(0.212)** (0.586)** (0.608)** (1.064)** (1.069)** (0.531)** 
(0.648)** (0.679)** (1.187)* (1.193)* (0.593)** 
Log Income 1973 -0.213 -0.288 -0.313 -0.373 -0.327 -0.270 
(0.087)** (0.102)*** (0.104)*** (0.139)*** (0.116)*** (0.095)*** 
(0.113)** (0.116)*** (0.155)** (0.129)** (0.106)** 
Ethnic Diversity 0.042 0.322 0.370 0.310 0.254 0.290 
(0.192) (0.275) (0.280) (0.292) (0.265) (0.254) 
(0.304) (0.313) (0.326) (0.295) (0.284) 
Polity Score 1973 0.008 0.004 -0.017 0.002 0.003 0.006 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
(0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Area 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population in mill. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Latitude -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.003)** (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003)** 
(0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003) (0.003)* (0.003)* 
Former Colony -0.084 -0.293 -0.323 -0.246 -0.269 -0.242 
(0.144) (0.205) (0.209) (0.205) (0.208) (0.183) 
(0.227) (0.233) (0.229) (0.232) (0.204) 
EU-12 Member -0.376 -0.414 -0.438 -0.311 -0.333 -0.416 
(0.116)*** (0.120)*** (0.122)*** (0.127)** (0.112)*** (0.118)*** 
(0.133)*** (0.136)*** (0.142)** (0.125)*** (0.131)*** 
Roads per 1,000 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.059 0.005 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.037)* (0.008) (0.009) 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.041) (0.009) (0.010) 
Phone Lines per 100 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.007 -0.017 0.005 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)** (0.006) 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)* (0.007) 
Religious Diversity x 0.051 
Polity Score 1973 (0.024)** 
(0.027)* 
Religious Diversity x 0.137 
Roads per 1,000 (0.079)* 
(0.088) 
Religious Diversity x 0.044 
Phone Lines per 100 (0.024)* 
(0.027)* 
Religious Diversity x 0.001 
Population in mill. (0.001) 
(0.001) 
Constant 2.255 3.183 3.461 4.128 3.861 3.016 
(0.746)*** (0.992)*** (1.024)*** (1.464)*** (1.313)*** (0.908)*** 
(1.096)*** (1.143)*** (1.634)** (1.465)** (1.014)*** 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R² 0.425 0.400 0.398 0.344 0.461 0.429 
The most important results are gained from the upper panel of Table 2. Religious diversity always 
enters negatively as proposed in the Introduction. It appears that higher levels of religious diversity are 
correlated with lower levels of national identity. This finding is statistically significant at the five 
percent level in almost all specifications. In columns 4 and 5 the coefficient fails to reach significance 
at the five percent level only slightly if the conditional likelihood ratio approach is used. However, the 
coefficient remains significant at the ten percent level. The size of the coefficient is remarkably larger 
in the instrumental variable regressions compared to the OLS regressions in column 1 and also in 
Table A3. It appears that the OLS estimation does indeed suffer from bias. 
In column 1, a difference in the index of religious diversity of 0.1 points correlates with a difference in 
our measure of national identity by 0.054 index points. Considering that national identity is distributed 
between -1 and +1, this effect is rather small. The index of religious diversity is by 0.856 index points 
higher in the most diverse country compared to the most homogeneous country. This implies a 
difference in national identity by 0.46 index points. Increasing religious diversity by one standard 
deviation goes along with national identity, which is lower by 0.11 index points, or 30% of a standard 
deviation. 
In the instrumental variable regression of column 2 the coefficient on religious diversity increases in 
absolute terms to 1.329, which implies that countries in which religious diversity is higher by 0.1 
index points display national identity which is lower by 0.133 index points. Compared to the 
interpretation above, the difference in religious diversity between the most and least homogeneous 
countries amounts to a difference in national identity of 1.14 index points. An increase of religious 
diversity by one standard deviation correlates with a reduction of national identity by 0.28 index 
points, or approximately three quarter of a standard deviation. 
Our results are in line with Masella (2013) who does not find a significant relationship between ethnic 
diversity and national identity. Somehow counter-intuitively he finds that the relationship is even 
slightly positive. Our results support this finding. In all specifications the coefficient on ethnic 
diversity is positive, however far from statistical significance. It appears that ethnic diversity is not an 
important driver for the formation of a national identity. The sociological and political literature 
feasibly assumes that social heterogeneity should have detrimental effects on the formation of a 
common identity. Our results indicate that religious diversity seems to be the driving force behind this 
argument. 
Our results establish a negative relationship between the level of income and national identity. The 
size of the coefficient is stable throughout all specifications, including the OLS regressions from Table 
A3. It takes on values between -0.21 and -0.24 in the OLS regressions and is slightly larger (-0.28 to   
-0.37) in the instrumental variable regressions. It always enters significantly at the one or, at least, five 
percent significance level. Taking the coefficient from column 2 implies that income, which is higher 
by one standard deviation is related to national identity levels which are lower by 0.25 index points, or 
two thirds of a standard deviation. 
From all the other covariates which we include in column 2, only latitude and the EU dummy variable 
enter statistically significantly. Latitude appears to be negatively related to national identity. The 
dummy variable for membership in the EU-12 enters negatively and highly significantly. Except from 
column 4 it is always significant at the one percent level. Being a member of the EU-12 reduces 
national identity by approximately 0.4 index points. Neither the Polity score, nor area and population, 
nor the mobility variables come close to statistical significance at conventional levels in column 2. 
In column 3 we include an interaction term between religious diversity and the Polity score. We find 
that this interaction term is positive and significant at the five percent level (at the ten percent level 
relying on the conditional likelihood ratio approach). The coefficient on the Polity score, which is 
slightly positive in all other regressions turns to negative when the interaction term is included. It is 
also larger in absolute terms. The interpretation behind this finding is as follows. Democratic 
institutions are negatively related to national identity at low levels of religious diversity. At higher 
levels of religious diversity, the relationship between the level of democracy and national identity 
becomes positive. The relationship between democracy and national identity is just zero if the index of 
religious diversity takes on the value 0.333. At lower levels of religious diversity, democracy and 
national identity are negatively related; at higher levels of religious diversity they are obviously 
positively related. It follows that the relationship between democratic institutions and national identity 
is positive at the mean and median values of religious diversity. 
The interpretation is similar for the results in columns 4 and 5 in which we include interaction terms 
between religious diversity and the two mobility variables. Both interaction terms are positive, 
whereas the coefficients on roads and phone lines become negative and significant in columns 4 and 5, 
respectively. It also has to be noted that the coefficient on religious diversity is absolutely larger in 
these two regressions. Similar to the interpretation of column 3, it appears that mobility and national 
identity are negatively related in religiously homogeneous countries. At higher levels of religious 
diversity the relationship becomes positive. The values of religious diversity at which the effect of 
mobility on national identity is zero equals 0.431 in the case of paved roads and 0.389 for phone lines. 
Rephrasing it from another perspective, the findings from columns 3 through 5 indicate that the 
negative relationship between religious diversity and the level of national identity can be attenuated by 
higher levels of democracy and mobility, respectively. 
Finally, interacting religious diversity and population size in column 6 does merely not change the 
results from column 2. It appears that population size does not influence the formation of a common 
national identity. Comparing these results to those from Table A3 does not reveal major differences, 
apart from differences in the size of the coefficients. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Our empirical estimations develop important results concerning the relationship between social 
heterogeneity and the formation of a national identity. Confirming the finding from Masella (2013), 
we find that ethnic diversity does not seem to be an important predictor of national identity. Instead, 
we show that religious diversity, as another dimension of social heterogeneity, is negatively correlated 
with the level of national identity. Interestingly, Georgiadis and Manning (2009) do not find an 
important influence of religion on national identity in Britain. However, they investigate the role of 
each specific denomination on national identity. Our approach reveals that religious diversity within a 
society affects the level to which people identify with their nationality. 
We propose the following interpretation of our main result. People search for networks with which 
they can identify. They generate utility from being part of a group that shares the same values and 
norms. These values and norms are to a large extent determined by cultural beliefs and religion is an 
integral part of a culture. In countries that are religiously very homogeneous people find it easy to 
share a set of common values with their neighbors. They engage in the same rituals and follow the 
same norms which serve as a signal that they agree on existing values in the society. When they realize 
that the entire population follows these same rules, people feel that they belong together, which results 
in the formation of a common national identity.  
Societies that are constituted of many different religious groups find it harder to share a set of common 
values. It may be that the rituals of one religious group are regarded as strange or maybe even wrong 
by another religious group. This can lead to conflicts between religious groups within one society. 
Consequently, the adherents to different denominations separate themselves from each other and they 
do not form a common identity on the national level. This interpretation is in line with the findings of 
Bisin et al. (2010) who point out that cultural distinctiveness describes peoples’ behavior. Apparently, 
people who cannot identify with others on a broader base prefer to form distinct and different 
identities.  
The role of religious diversity appears to be of major importance for the formation of a common 
identity compared to ethnic diversity. No one can be made responsible for his ethnic heritage. 
However, as shown by the literature on religious switching, religious networks may be chosen 
independent of race. If people of different ethnicities engage in the same religious rituals and beliefs 
they share a common culture. Practicing the same religious faith can even overcome possible 
prejudices which might be based on ethnic differences. On the contrary, different religious groups may 
find it hard to find compromises on which rituals and norms are right and which should be abandoned. 
Choosing a religious group is more important for the formation of a common identity than the given 
ethnic background. This can explain why ethnic diversity does not reveal a significant relationship 
with national identity while religious diversity does.  
In columns 3 through 6 of Table 2 we investigated the role of institutions, which might mediate the 
effect of religious diversity on national identity. We have shown that the Polity score, as a proxy 
variable for democratic institutions, has a negative impact on the level of national identity when 
religious diversity is low. However, this effect turns out to be positive if religious diversity is 
sufficiently high. Since the relationship between religious diversity itself and national identity is 
negative, it appears that democratic institutions can alleviate this negative effect. Georgiadis and 
Manning (2009) also show that people from minority groups feel less well of if they feel that they are 
discriminated against. In autocratic regimes there is a higher probability that minority groups are 
discriminated against by the ruling elite. If the country has more democratic institutions, minority 
groups can participate in elections and the political decision process. It follows that countries in which 
religious diversity is very high, democratic institutions can help to form a common identity because 
different religious practices are not banned as being wrong. One could argue that democratic 
institutions create a higher level of tolerance so that people can form a common national identity based 
on other factors than their religious beliefs. It should not remain unmentioned that democratic 
institutions appear to have a detrimental effect on national identity in very homogeneous countries. 
Smith (1991) argues that mobility throughout the country is another important factor for national 
identification. Our baseline regressions did not reveal a significant relationship. However, the 
interaction terms in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 imply that mobility is positively related to national 
identity when religious diversity is high. Mobility throughout the country, either physical or non-
physical, can overcome the negative effect of religious diversity because it helps to get into contact 
with other people. As long as individuals interact only with people from their own religious group they 
might generate prejudices against those from other religious groups. These can be mitigated if 
travelling throughout the country is possible. If people see that their fellow countrymen are not that 
different from themselves although they adhere to a different faith, they will still be able to form a 
common identity. 
Finally, we find that income and national identity are negatively related. Although we cannot 
definitely determine the way of causation, it appears feasible to assume that higher income leads to 
lower levels of national identity. Paldam and Gundlach (2013) show that rising levels of income lead 
to a reduction in religiosity. Gundlach and Opfinger (2013) and Hirschle (2011) argue that it becomes 
more costly to engage in time-consuming religious behavior as the income level rises. People face 
higher opportunity costs when spending several hours in a temple or church if they can generate a high 
income in the same time compared to a situation where wages are very low. This leads to a decrease in 
religiosity when income levels rise. 
A similar way of argumentation may hold for national identity. If people face the opportunity to gain 
high income they might spend less time figuring out if their neighbors share the same values and 
engage in the same rituals. It might be more important to them with whom they can cooperate to 
generate income, independent of religious or ethnic background. Furthermore, the social sciences and 
psychological literature proposes that there is a trend of isolation in the richest societies. This trend 
might be termed ‘rising individualism’ (compare Kahneman, 2011). As the world becomes ever more 
globalized and networked via internet and other modern media the need for social interaction on a 
personal basis might decline. This induces people to reduce their interest in their neighbors and the 
rest of their fellow countrymen. In a highly individualistic society people do not feel the need to search 
for networks with which they can identify. This reduces the ties to one's society and therefore leads to 
a lower level of national identity.  
Psychological studies, which are based on influential work by Tajfel (1970) stress the importance of 
common values, or a common identity, for the smooth functioning of a society. The probability of 
social tensions can be reduced if a common national identity is formed. Consequently, one can ask 
which policy advice can be drawn from our findings if nation-building policies should be adopted. 
Apparently, lower levels of religious diversity are related to higher national identity. However, the 
solution must not be to force the whole population to adopt the same religion. Rather, governments 
should pursue policies which make differences in religious belief less important in everyday life. The 
main policy goal should be to prevent people from being discriminated against because of their 
religion. This might help the formation of a common national identity, as Georgiadis and Manning 
(2009) show. 
Furthermore, our results imply that democratic institutions and mobility throughout the country can 
alleviate the negative effect of religious diversity on national identity. Democracy, as well as mobility, 
are positively related to national identity if religious diversity is sufficiently high. It appears 
appropriate to conclude that democratic institutions should be adopted in diverse countries and 
investments in the infrastructure which foster mobility can help to refute prejudices against different 
groups. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We calculate a measure for national identity to make it comparable across countries. Our index is 
based on answers to questions from the World Values Survey and consists of three indicators: the 
preferred geographical group, willingness to fight for the country, and pride for the nationality. 
In the empirical part we investigate the relationship between this measure of national identity and 
social heterogeneity. Although earlier research suggests that diversity should have a negative influence 
on national identity, Masella (2013) cannot find a statistically significant relationship between national 
identity and ethnic diversity. We can confirm this finding. But our results indicate that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between our measure of national identity and religious 
diversity. 
Furthermore, we find that there appears to be a negative relationship between the level of income and 
national identity. Democratic institutions and mobility throughout the country, which have been 
proposed as important determinants for the formation of a national identity, seem to have a positive 
effect on national identity only if the level of religious diversity is sufficiently high. 
We argue that people search for networks with which they can identify. These networks are based on 
common values and norms which can be found in executing the same religious rituals. If the entire 
population belongs to the same religion a common culture emerges with which people identify. 
However, if people belong to different religions they cannot find a set of common values. High 
religious diversity may lead to conflict between the different groups, which prevents the population 
from forming a common national identity.  
We propose that governments should pursue policies, which secure the rights of minorities. People 
must not feel discriminated against because this feeling might weaken their ties to the nation. 
Furthermore, building up democratic institutions should be supported as these might help overcome 
the negative effect of high religious diversity. Investments in infrastructure can have possible positive 
effects on national identity if these help to reduce prejudices within the population. 
 
APPENDIX 
Figure A1: Distribution of national identity at the microlevel 
-FIGURE A1 HERE- 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of the national identity index at the micro level 
Indicators Mean SD Obs 
Very proud of nationality (=1) 0.562 0.496 332,747 
Willing to fight for country (=1) 0.732 0.443 256,999 
Geographical group belonging to: country (=1) 0.337 0.472 254,120 
    
National identity index (mean) -0.009  172,753 
National identity index (sd) 1.009   
National identity index (min) -1.921   
National identity index (max) 1.443   
% of covariance explained by first principal component 0.291   
Eigenvalue of first principal component 1.681   
 
Table A2: National Identity at the country level (means) 
Country Index 
Value 
Willing 
to fight 
Belonging 
to country 
Proud of 
nationality 
Country Index 
Value 
Willing 
to fight 
Belonging 
to country 
Proud of 
nationality 
Albania 0.173 0.763 0.290 0.648 Lithuania -0.349 0.750 0.279 0.272 
Argentina 0.033 0.626 0.467 0.587 Luxembourg -0.393 0.544 0.246 0.476 
Armenia 0.063 0.804 0.455 0.435 Macedonia 0.309 0.815 0.369 0.643 
Australia 0.320 0.710 0.438 0.706 Malta 0.235 0.721 0.306 0.759 
Austria -0.255 0.604 0.267 0.537 Mexico 0.129 0.771 0.264 0.706 
Azerbaijan 0.508 0.971 0.451 0.637 Moldova -0.212 0.774 0.332 0.257 
Bangladesh 0.580 0.922 0.463 0.754 Morocco 0.886 0.883 0.617 0.776 
Belarus -0.157 0.880 0.270 0.312 Netherlands -0.555 0.586 0.354 0.216 
Belgium -0.859 0.379 0.226 0.281 New Zealand 0.234 0.640 0.556 0.678 
Bosnia/Herc. -0.017 0.783 0.322 0.472 Nigeria 0.045 0.714 0.306 0.674 
Brazil -0.248 0.535 0.298 0.556 Norway -0.056 0.893 0.176 0.479 
Bulgaria 0.037 0.767 0.376 0.424 Peru 0.407 0.822 0.341 0.782 
Canada -0.029 0.640 0.303 0.656 Philippines 0.283 0.874 0.156 0.797 
Chile 0.114 0.700 0.415 0.597 Poland 0.489 0.846 0.398 0.677 
China 0.145 0.925 0.433 0.312 Portugal -0.319 0.680 0.318 0.582 
Croatia -0.149 0.818 0.196 0.421 Romania 0.057 0.810 0.298 0.440 
Czech Rep. -0.278 0.740 0.358 0.287 Russia -0.317 0.807 0.230 0.333 
Denmark -0.152 0.809 0.265 0.395 Serbia -0.151 0.756 0.233 0.396 
Dominican R. 0.100 0.788 0.088 0.762 Slovak Rep. -0.388 0.706 0.210 0.320 
Estonia -0.364 0.832 0.171 0.251 Slovenia 0.292 0.863 0.375 0.580 
Finland 0.080 0.852 0.372 0.481 South Africa 0.198 0.677 0.430 0.698 
France -0.470 0.577 0.286 0.344 Spain -0.234 0.569 0.299 0.519 
Georgia 0.241 0.714 0.493 0.696 Sweden -0.059 0.884 0.245 0.403 
Germany -0.932 0.433 0.186 0.211 Switzerland -0.360 0.712 0.212 0.345 
Guatemala 0.377 0.696 0.405 0.878 Tanzania 0.467 0.931 0.249 0.817 
Hungary -0.052 0.799 0.304 0.553 Turkey 0.629 0.956 0.452 0.697 
Iceland 0.159 0.755 0.493 0.601 Uganda 0.108 0.651 0.429 0.659 
India 0.434 0.877 0.337 0.729 Ukraine -0.316 0.778 0.263 0.257 
Iraq 0.022 0.372 0.597 0.805 United Kingdom -0.069 0.694 0.294 0.522 
Ireland 0.021 0.611 0.282 0.725 Uruguay 0.158 0.548 0.520 0.747 
Italy -0.644 0.435 0.248 0.400 USA 0.236 0.737 0.291 0.745 
Japan -0.939 0.257 0.331 0.259 Venezuela 0.629 0.840 0.408 0.930 
Korea (Rep.) -0.033 0.809 0.403 0.314 Vietnam 0.757 0.964 0.542 0.798 
Kyrgyzstan 0.122 0.870 0.467 0.429 Zimbabwe 0.098 0.553 0.431 0.775 
Latvia -0.166 0.804 0.324 0.364      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Regression results with interaction terms and OLS estimation  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Religious Diversity -0.587 -0.803 -1.048 -0.555 
(0.210)*** (0.275)*** (0.295)*** (0.219)** 
Log Income 1973 -0.226 -0.241 -0.244 -0.211 
(0.085)** (0.088)*** (0.084)*** (0.088)** 
Ethnic Diversity 0.055 0.041 0.057 0.045 
(0.189) (0.190) (0.185) (0.194) 
Polity Score 1973 -0.008 0.007 0.007 0.009 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Area 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population in mill. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Latitude -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Former Colony -0.090 -0.071 -0.108 -0.077 
(0.141) (0.143) (0.139) (0.147) 
EU-12 Member -0.391 -0.342 -0.343 -0.378 
(0.114)*** (0.117)*** (0.112)*** (0.117)*** 
Roads per 1,000 0.002 -0.016 0.005 0.002 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
Phone Lines per 100 -0.002 0.000 -0.011 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)* (0.005) 
Religious Diversity x 0.040 
Polity Score 1973 (0.022)* 
Religious Diversity x 0.044 
Roads per 1,000 (0.030) 
Religious Diversity x 0.021 
Phone Lines per 100 (0.009)** 
Religious Diversity x 0.000 
Population in mill. (0.001) 
Constant 2.390 2.569 2.732 2.243 
(0.735)*** (0.768)*** (0.743)*** (0.753)*** 
Observations 66 66 66 66 
adj. R² 0.448 0.438 0.471 0.416 
 
REFERENCES 
Ainsworth, Martha and Deon Filmer (2006). Children's Schooling: AIDS, Orphanhood, Poverty, and 
Gender, World Development 34: 1099-1128. 
Akerlof, George A and Rachel E. Kranton (2000). Economics and Identity, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115: 715-753. 
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly (1999). Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1243-1284. 
Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg 
(2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8: 155-194. 
Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore (2003). The Size of Nations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Anderson, Benedict (2006). Imagined Communities, second ed.. London: Verso. 
Andrews, Donald W.K., Marcelo J. Moreira and James H. Stock (2007). Performance of conditional 
Wals tests in IV regression with weak instruments, Journal of Econometrics 139: 116-132. 
Austen-Smith, David and Roland G. Fryer, Jr. (2005). An Economic Analysis of 'Acting White', 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 551-583. 
Battu, Harminder, McDonald Mwale and Yves Zenou (2007). Oppositional identities and the labor 
market, Journal of Population Economics 20: 643-667. 
Bisin, Alberto, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou (2010). Bend It Like Beckham: 
Ethnic Identity and Integration, NBER Working Paper, 16465. 
Bloom, William (1990). Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, British 
Journal of Political Science 20: 1-10. 
Bodenhorn, Howard and Christopher S. Ruebeck (2003). The Economics of Identity and the 
Endogeneity of Race, NBER Working Paper, 9962. 
Bollen, Kenneth A., Jennifer L. Glanville and Guy Stecklov (2002). Economic Status Proxies in 
Studies of Fertility In Developing Countries: Does the Measure matter?, Population Studies 56: 81-96. 
Bond, Ross (2006). Belonging and Becoming: National Identity and Exclusion, Sociology 40: 609-
626. 
Calhoun, Craig (1993). Nationalism and Ethnicity, Annual Review of Sociology 19: 211-239. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999). Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 
International Studies Quarterly 43: 84-114. 
Clots-Figueras, Irma and Paolo Masella (2010). Education, Language and Identity, mimeo. 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (1998). On economic causes of civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 
50: 563-573. 
Constant, Amelie F. and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2008). Measuring Ethnic Identity and its Impact on 
Economic Behavior, Journal of the European Economic Association 6: 424-433. 
Constant, Amelie F., Liliya Gataulina and Klaus F. Zimmermann (2009). Ethnosizing immigrants, 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 69: 274-287. 
Darity, Jr., William A., Patrick L. Mason and James B. Stewart (2006). The economics of identity: 
The origin and persistence of racial identity norms, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
60: 283-305. 
Easterly, William and Ross Levine (1997). Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1203-1250. 
Eaton, B. Curtis, Mukesh Eswaran and Robert J. Oxoby (2011). ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: the origin of 
identity, and its economic implications, Canadian Journal of Economics 44: 719-748. 
Filmer, Deon and Lant Pritchett (2001). Estimating Wealth Effects without Expenditure Data - or 
Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India, Demography 38: 115-132. 
Filmer, Deon and Kinnon Scott (2008). Assessing Asset Indices, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4605. 
Fincher, Corey L. and Randy Thornhill (2008). Assortative sociality, limited dispersal, infectious 
disease and the genesis of the global pattern of religious diversity, Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
Biological Sciences. 
Gillis, John.R. (Ed.), (1996). Commemorations: the politics of national identity. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Georgiadis, Andreas and Alan Manning (2009). One Nation Under a Groove? Identity and 
Multiculturalism in Britain, CEP Discussion Paper No 944. 
Gundlach, Erich and Matthias Opfinger (2012). Religiosity as a Determinant of Happiness, Review of 
Development Economics, forthcoming. 
Hirschle, Jochen (2011). The affluent society and its religious consequences: an empirical 
investigation of 20 European countries, Socio-Economic Review 9: 261-285. 
Jones, F.L. (1997). Ethnic diversity and national identity, Journal of Sociology 33: 285-305 
Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York City, NY: Macmillan. 
Kiely, Richard, Frank Bechhofer, Robert Stewart and David McCrone (2001). The markers and rules 
of Scottish national identity. The Sociological Review 49: 33-55. 
LaPorta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1999). The Quality 
of Government, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15: 222-279. 
Maier, Charles S. (1997). The unmasterable past: history, holocaust and German national identity. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Manning, Alan and Sanchari Roy (2009). Culture Clash or Culture Club? National Identity in Britain, 
The Economic Journal 120: F72-F100. 
Masella, Paolo (2013). National Identity and Ethnic Diversity, Journal of Population Economics 26: 
437-454. 
Miguel, Edward (2004). Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus 
Tanzania, World Politics 56: 328-362. 
Miles, William F.S. and David A. Rochefort (1991). Nationalism Versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-
Saharan Africa, American Political Science Review 85: 393-403. 
Miller, David (2000). Citizenship and national identity. Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Montalvo, Jose G. and Marta Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic development, 
Journal of Development Economics 76: 293-323. 
Montalvo, Jose G. and Marta Reynal-Querol (2005a). Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil 
Wars, American Economic Review 95: 796-816. 
Moreira, Marcelo J. (2003). A Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test for Structural Models, Econometrica 
71: 1027-1048. 
Musick, Marc and John Wilson (1995). Religious Switching for Marriage Reasons, Sociology of 
Religion, 56: 257-270. 
Noiriel, Gérard (1996). The French melting pot: Immigration, citizenship, and national identity. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga (2012). Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 94: 20-36. 
Paldam, Martin and Erich Gundlach (2013). The Religious Transition: A long-run perspective, Public 
Choice 156: 105-123. 
Sahn, David E. and David Stifel (2001). Poverty Comparisons over Time and Across Countries in 
Africa, World Development 28: 2123-2155. 
Sahn, David E. and David Stifel (2003). Exploring Alternative Measures of Welfare in the Absence of 
Expenditure Data, Review of Income and Wealth 49: 463-489. 
Sastry, Narayan (2004). Trends in Socioeconomic Inequalities in Mortality in Developing Countries: 
The case of Child Survival in Sao Paulo, Brazil, Demography 41: 443-464. 
Sherkat, Darren E. (1991). Leaving The Faith: Testing Theories of Religious Switching Using 
Survival Models, Social Science and Research 20: 171-187. 
Smith, Anthony D. (1991). National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press. 
Smith, Anthony D. (1992). National identity and the idea of European unity, International Affairs 68: 
55-76. 
Stifel, David and Luc Christiaensen (2007). Tracking Poverty Over Time in the Absence of 
Comparable Consumption Data, The World Bank Economic Review 21: 317-341. 
Stock, James H. and Motohiro Yogo (2002). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression, 
NBER Working Paper, 10284. 
Tabellini, Guido (2010). Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 8: 677-716. 
Tajfel, Henri (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination, Scientific American 223: 96-102. 
Triandafyllidou, Anna (1998). National identity and the 'other', Ethnic and Racial Studies 21: 593-612. 
Vanhanen, Tatu (1999). Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative Analysis, 
Journal of Peace Research 36: 55-73. 
Wodak, Ruth, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Leibhart (1998). Zur diskursiven 
Konstruktion nationaler Identität. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
 
